Why do Middle Eastern and North African countries?

Joseph Waweru Why do Middle Eastern and North African countries lack democratic governments? Is it the Arabic language or the Muslim faith? Columbia University scholars, Alfred Stephan and Graeme B. Robertson, seem to have the answers. In regards to Arabism and Islam, the duo classifies nations associated with the former as democratic “underachievers” and the latter as “overachievers”. A state’s classification as an overachiever/underachiever is based upon their Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPpc).

In addition, they observe political rights on a scale to help them determine which states exhibit “electoral competitiveness. ” They structure their argument into three phases: quantitative, qualitative, and implications of the prior phases’ results. Finally, Stephan and Robertson offer possible solutions and scenarios that must take place in order for the political atmosphere in Arab countries to transform. The data used comes from the Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties by Freedom House and Ted Gurr’s Polity Project.

The year 1972 is chosen as the suitable year to compare the data from both sources. Freedom in the World ranks nations on a scale of 1-7 whereas 1 is the highest and 7 is the lowest. Nations that are ranked 3 (and above) are considered “electoral competitive”. The Polity Project ranks nations from strong autocratic (-10) to strong democratic (+10). Nations that are ranked at least (+4) are classified as “electoral competitive”. What constitutes as “electoral competitive? ” According to the duo, government positions must be filled through fair elections.

Governments like Egypt cannot bar individuals and parties from participating in elections. Secondly, high government positions should be filled with individuals who are elected though fair means, unlike Lebanon, whose executive and parliamentary government is authoritarian. In addition, a nation must meet these criteria for at least three years to be considered electorally competitive. They also emphasize that electoral competitiveness is not democracy but a prerequisite for it. The use of “Arabic” and “Muslim” interchangeably reflect the common misconception that the two words mean the same; they do not.

The former represents regions that speak Arabic and the latter represents regions that practice Islam. Using this template, Stephan and Robertson group their findings into: Arab Muslim, Arab non-Muslim, and non-Arab Muslim-majority. From the onset, we notice that Arab countries have relatively weak political and electoral rights. Only Lebanon, one of the sixteen Arab countries and coincidentally the only Muslim-majority state in this group, had three years of consecutive strong electoral rights. No Arab country had five years of consecutive strong political rights (32).

On the contrary, 38% of the thirty non-Arab Muslim countries examined had strong political and electoral rights for three consecutive years while 27% of the same group went for five consecutive years. The likelihood of a non-Arab Muslim country to be “electoral competitive” was 2000% higher than an Arab Muslim state. This extensive gap reiterates the authors claim that Arab states are associated with the lack of democratic zeal. In the quantitative phase, Stephan and Robertson examine GDPpc. They search for a link between levels of income and political rights.

They characterize them as follows: Non-Arab Muslim states whose GDPpc is under $1500 are great electoral overachievers, those that are under $3500 are electorally non-competitive and those that are over $5500 are electorally competitive. There are no electoral underachievers within this group. For Arab Muslim states, there is not a country whose GDPpc is below $3500. In addition, there are neither great electoral achievers nor electoral competitive states. In fact, 44% of the countries in this group are electoral underachievers and their GDPpc is over $5500.

They assert that there is no Muslim gap in regards to political rights. The qualitative phase deals with the nature of government. They state that in non-Arab Muslim countries, like Senegal, Turkey, and Niger, powerful incumbents have been voted out of office by constituents. Niger is an interesting case since its GDPpc is equal to that of Yemen, an Arab majority state, yet it’s ranked (+4) and Yemen ranked (-2) on the Polity Project scale. In addition, Arab countries are classified into three groups: complete autocratic states, liberalizing, and those that once showed promise to be democratic.

The authors suggest that election bans, coercion, fraud, civil war, and military coups are to blame for the lack of democratic governments in Arab countries. The findings of Stephan and Robertson also seem to counter prior arguments made by other scholars. For example, it is thought that economic development leads to democracy because development correlates with greater political participation. The authors disagree with this notion. They compare political participation between India and the United States and conclude that the poor members of the former are more politically involved than those of the latter.

They also disagree with the theory that differences in languages and ethnicities within a society are detrimental to democracy. They claim that “electoral competitive” states actually began with the high levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation while “electoral non-competitive” states had low levels. In conclusion, Stephan and Robertson believe the electoral gap is an Arab one, not Muslim. Factors such as their heritage to the Ottoman Empire and their failure to transition from authoritarian government explain the gap.

In addition, they believe that if the Arab world recognized each other as legitimate and sovereign nations and if military spending was reduced in favor for domestic improvement, then democracy should form in the region. They believe democracy will be achieved through internal means rather than external. And they are right. Eight years after this essay was written, Arab countries like Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco are becoming democratic mainly due to internal pressures.