Relativism in Culture and Morality

It is said that morality is nothing more or less than obeying the rules imposed by one’s own culture. With this in mind, the most fundamental premise is that there must be culture prior to having a morality, or similarly, culture gives way to morality. It is also said that if one’s culture requires that a certain act be done or be refrained from, then doing that act or refraining from doing is one’s moral duty. Thus, doing or refraining from doing things as moral precepts entail the presumption that it should or should not be done because culture espouses that thought. If a certain culture does not prohibit or allow a certain act from being done or otherwise, it must be the case, then, that the act cannot be attributed to any moral boundaries.

Moreover, it has also been said that all of one’s moral duties are not absolutely held by all people for there are cultural variations across various civilizations. Suicide in the contemporary times may be an immoral act, but in earlier times the Japanese culture may even allow suicide and treat it as morally required. These things point the idea that there is no encompassing morality transcending time and regional boundaries.

As more and more people grow and as nations rise and fall, one can hardly contest the idea that the morality held by the people centuries ago may be found to be obsolete these days. This is in the sense that not only does culture vary among societies. Culture also varies from within these respective societies, evolving with time and thus creating a corresponding paradigm shift in those societies’ perception of morality.

How, then, should we treat and differentiate moral relativism and cultural relativism? In order to have a better grasp of the question at hand, it should be noted that the idea of relativism is that nothing can be taken as absolute and that variations are present and indicate that things are relative. The idea of moral relativism then becomes an idea which opposes the absoluteness of moral precepts, or of a single arbitrarily given morality as supreme and the only morality held by different societies.

On the other hand, cultural relativism would then present itself as an idea which indicates that, in much the same way as moral relativism, no single culture is exactly the same as another culture, and that the idea of a single and unifying culture is bound to be dissolved precisely because cultural variations are present everywhere.

The essential difference between cultural and moral relativism stems from the core terms ‘morality’ and ‘culture’. It has been said beforehand that culture gives way to morality and that moral standards are dependent on the cultural foundation of certain societies. This being the case, the difference between morality and culture is that the latter is the foundation of the former and that the former will disintegrate or would have not come into existence without the latter. For instance, the moral precept that “cheating is bad” would not have come into what it is when there is no culture which believes in that precept, or when there is no culture which treats it as a moral principle.

To put things in another way, the sense of rightness or wrongness is not entirely absolute or binding to all individuals. What is right for an American may not necessarily be right in the sensibilities of and moral doctrines subscribed to by Japanese citizens. It would likewise be not fitting to view and justify the actions of Nigerians from the moral perspective of a Norwegian precisely because what goes for Norwegians only befits Norwegians at least in terms of moral doctrines. The relativism of morality is even truer from within the ranks and files of nations. Even from within societies, not all people have the same moral beliefs, and that their sense of rightness or wrongness does not necessarily fit into a single and unified moral scheme.

Apart from the fact that not all people subscribe to the same and exact moral doctrines whether in the past or today, the multiple moral doctrines we have today reinforces the idea that morality emanates from a single cultural system alone. The main premise behind this is that every nation or perhaps every society is culturally unique. It has been said before that culture gives way to morality, and the mere existence of many different moralities only suggest the corresponding idea that all of these moralities came from a single cultural source.

Indeed, it would be dangerous to assume that, in one way or another, the moral dogmas of Chinese are entirely related to the moral dogmas of the Afghans, or that these two nations hold the same source for their moral foundations, which is a single culture. Not only is it difficult to comprehend and accept even its hypothetical validity, it is also dangerous precisely because two distinct cultures would essentially put forward their own moral doctrines which blend well enough with the structure and inner workings of their societies.

Cultural experiences of individuals also vary, depending on the situation or on the society in which one belongs. For many centuries, civilizations have given birth to people who have strong ties to the culture they grow up with, eventually giving these people a strong sense of attachment to the culture they belong. The best way to understand or at least see the distinctness of a culture is through its people who eventually will signify that no two cultures are exactly the same, although it can be accepted that there may be certain overlapping features or similar characteristics.

Yet it must be reminded that being similar does not necessarily mean being the same. Taken collectively, the various cultures may appear to be a large fabric of many different colored patches. The same can also be said about cultural experiences, and the extent of the differences among the specific cultures may extend indefinitely for one solid reason: cultures evolve through time.

To say that there is cultural evolution implies that moral precepts are continuously evolving, or changing, as well. It would suffice to say that a change in cultural entities, whether large or small, entails a consequent effect on moral entities. That is, people may start thinking and acting newer forms of their culture, in some or in whole parts, abandoning old customs or merging them with new ones. One result would be that the moral beliefs of these people would also begin to change. For instance, technological advancements have given rise to certain cultural ideologies not present in the past.

We now have societies whose culture has been deeply embedded in the information and communication technology era like that of the Japanese who constantly harbor advanced forms of technology and applying them to their lives. The sense of right and wrong have been affected by these forms of technology, paving the way for new ethical standards which seek to foster the delicate balance between doing what is right and doing what is just. More specifically, the use of the internet has created a new moral field in terms of the ethical standards which envelop the user’s experience of the internet.

At this point, the relativism of a changing culture is emphasized more and more by the sharp contrast between the nations which have a strong technological grasp and the societies which still lack these things. Even more so, it should be clear that the nations with strong technological grasp are the ones which are most likely to realize the ethical standards drawn upon by the use of these technologies.

On the other hand, nations which are yet to experience these technologies may not be aware at all of any ethical standards directly related to these technological benefits. These things only show that the relativism of both culture and morality is not only emphasized by their variations among societies but is also highlighted by the changes in culture and, consequently, morality brought about by the experiences of the society and the changes which take place through time and development.

One argument which can be posed as a challenge to the relativism of culture and morality is the idea that even though there are differences, it still does not warrant the idea that culture and morality are both relative. That is, even if there are perceivable specific differences to the culture of a certain society to that of another, or to the morality of one community to that of the other, the general presumptions of morality and culture remain the same across these unique societies. For example, Indian and Saudi Arabian societies may hold specific differences with regard to their moral and cultural precepts.

But when these two precepts are viewed from a larger and more general perspective, one may observe that morality remains the sense of right and wrong and that culture remains the way of life. The argument being posited against the relativist claim is that differences arise in the specific details of culture and morality to every society yet these differences do not altogether warrant the idea that everything else in morality and culture is relative. Specific differences do not guarantee relativism and that a more general understanding of the culture and morality of different societies remain the same—morality remains the sense of right and wrong while culture remains as the way of life.

Such an argument against the relativism of culture and morality is bound to encounter at least two criticisms: first is that it abandons or neglects the factual differences of cultures and moralities by reverting to a more general perception of the two and second is that it also confuses the idea of differences and its implication of relativism.

By reverting to a general perception of culture and morality, the argument against relativism neglects the fact or sets aside the fact that there are differences between cultures and moralities both within and without the societies in order to serve the purpose of refuting relativism. While the argument does not put forward any claim for absolutism for culture and morality, it can be understood that such an argument nevertheless seeks refuge in the thought of a general culture and a general morality. By simply positing the definitions of culture and morality, it appears that the argument is a mere tautology which does not argue well.

Further, the argument against relativism asserts that the differences do not guarantee relativism. Such an argument may only gain merit if there are no factual differences which, in, reality, signifies or espouses relativism. Apparently, there are factual differences and that these differences do not only stand by themselves as mere differences but more importantly as indicators that cultures and moral doctrines are relative.

Moreover, the argument fails to take into consideration the fact that certain cultures and moral doctrines have also changed albeit gradually. These changes further strengthen the fact that there are wide differences even today as societies continuously evolve. If it is indeed true that there is no relativism in both culture and morality, it must also be true that the things that Japanese citizens hold to be right and wrong are also in line with what the rest of the world holds to be right and wrong. Apparently, this is not the case precisely because there are factual differences and that these differences are precisely the reason why there is relativism in culture and morality.

In conclusion, culture gives rise to moral precepts and that changes in culture would eventually spur corresponding changes in these moral precepts. These changes may not necessarily occur simultaneously across various societies, which is why there are differences among cultures and moral precepts at the least. The evolution of societies from past to present have correspondingly caused changes in cultural beliefs as well as moral perceptions of people, thereby positing the fact that culture and morality have been relative since early years.

Bibliography

Oppenheim, Felix. “In Defense of Relativism.” The Western Political Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1955): 411-417.