Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform Impact and the Way Ahead

Final Post 9/11 Intelligence Reform Impact and the Way Ahead Daniel Ratner INTL 444 Professor Mead October 8, 2012 Introduction After 9/11, an event so shocking, and humiliating to both the American people, and the U. S. Government, vast reforms were identified to ensure that an attack of this magnitude never happened again. From the ashes of this despicable act came two major pieces of Intelligence reform. These documents were the 9/11 Commission Report and The Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorist Prevent Act of 2004 (IRTPA).

Both documents worked to reform the Intelligence Community (IC), and streamline current processes to improve the sharing of intelligence information, and products. With the sweeping changes mainly through the ITPRA the Intelligence Community is well on its way to being the major muscle group we need it to be acting as a single unit as opposed to separate and individual muscles all trying to lift the same heavy weight.

With the findings of the 9/11 commission, the implementations of the IRTPA have taken long strides, but what can be done better? We will look at the two pieces of legislation, and then compare and contrast the sweeping changes, and if the are going in the correct direction. The 9/11 Commission Report In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a group of politicians both Republican and Democrats came together to identify shortfalls and introduce a call for reform. According the report, “Our aim has not been to assign individual blame.

Our aim has been to provide the fullest account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned. ” When we as Americans have a major event in the United States, we always look for a scapegoat, the ideas behind the 9/11 commission was built as a bi-partisan group for just this reason. The report takes the events of 9/11 and attempts to paint a picture of a major lack of understanding of the threat we face from radical Islam, as well as other disenchanted with is around the world.

The 9/11 report goes deep into the history of the events surrounding 9/11, but really only spends about 25 pages of the 450 pages report identifying the shortcomings, and way ahead. Now while this is a macro view of the reforms needed, it does leave much to the imagination. Post 9/11 Reform As we look at the reforms recommended we see that the commission broke the recommendations into major groups, they divided them into ways to give Overall Government Reform.

This is subdivided into five categories, a new Unity of Effort between Foreign and Domestic operations in an attempt to mandate primacy in different types of operations to ensure the proper agency is doing the correct job, A Unity of Effort for the Intelligence Community, Unity of Effort in Sharing Information, Unity of Effort of in the Congress, and finally how to better organizing Homeland defenses. While these are all important, the major issue was the lack of ownership and sharing of intelligence between governmental agencies.

As the 9/11 commission pushed for counterterrorism reform, it also pointed to a need for intelligence reform. the IC reform was aimed at the way we collect process and disseminate intelligence. The 9/11 commission struck to identify, “whether the government is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities it will need not just for countering terrorism, but for the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. This viewpoint looks at the National Intelligence Agencies and strive to focus their power to be both effective, and balanced. Coupled with these factors the 9/11 commission identified six major problems, the structural barriers to performing joint intelligence work, lack of common standards and practices across the foreign-domestic divide. Divided management of national intelligence capabilities, weak capacity to set priorities and move resources, too many jobs, and too complex and secret. Structural Barriers To Performing Joint Intelligence Work

Along with the issues of trying to keep ahead of our enemies, we must also be able to share our information with other intelligence agencies, and our allies. As the 9/11 report shows: “National intelligence is still organized around the collection disciplines of the home agencies, not the joint mission. The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to “connect the dots. ” No one component holds all the relevant information. ” While all agencies collect information, only through joint integration can we truly paint an accurate assessment of the facts.

As a reference, the report cites the Goldwater Nichols legislation of 1986, in which Operations as a whole were better envisioned though joint co-operative training. It shows the strengths of these types of events and why we must incorporate more joint intelligence to be successful. Lack Of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide This portion of the report goes on to show the issues we have in the cases of both database management and dissemination of information. In cases of information gathered both home and abroad, there are issues with integration and synchronization of this workflow.

Many have cited and shown how across the IC there are multiple databases, of which there is no conduit to share information, multiple programs collecting the same data, but are not cross-matched, and in many cases redundant entries are made, and then not managed creating an abundance of information unable to be processed due to a lack of manpower. Divided Management of National Intelligence Capabilities As the IC swelled in the post World War 2 and Cold War eras, we saw the abilities of many agencies in collections dwindle and collapse.

The report shoes the degradation of the CIA’s ability to collect IMINT, and SIGINT. As the NSA, NRO NGIA, and other have been created, the HUMINT, OSINT and other intelligence collected by the CIA has had issues being validated due to the inability to task other agencies assets. Some of these issues were solved through their acquisition of their own satellites and some reform, but again we see information that is collected by a sole agency, which is not easily shared or validated by an outside source. Weak Capacity to Set Priorities and Move Resources

The task organization of the IC and the way in which it is managed fell on the Director of Central Intelligence, giving the CIA free reign in many cases, and also in many cases too much ability to mismanage or squander resources. As they struggle to manage these resources, and ensure all members of the IC are covered for what they need, there was little oversight in the ability to prioritize collection efforts. Moreover, there was little though given to how to best manage , “what they collect or the way they collect it. ” Too Many Jobs As of the time of the 9/11 report the DCI had three jobs.

Running of the CIA, manage the other members of the IC, and head analyst for the President of the United States. Any one of these positions is a capstone to a successful career; in the days of 9/11 it fell on one person. As the report goes on to show, is the fact that, “No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usually what loses out is management of the intelligence community…” This overtasking of an individual is not only reckless, but in many cases gave too much power to the CIA. The report finds that the DCI has three major shortcomings.

They find that the DCI lacks the ability to control the funds allocated to the IC, the ability to remove or replace agency heads, and the ability to set the quality control and standardization of collection efforts. Too Complex and Secret As if all the previous five findings were not enough, we also see the issue of a cumbersome and hidden group of organizations. At the time of the 9/11 report, the IC was comprised of 15 agencies, mainly managed by a single entity. This coupled with no clear roadmap to how the groups interact, whom they report to, and how they fund operations.

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) Out of the ashes of the events of 9/11 and the reforms brought forth by the 9/11 Commission report, came the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). This legislation known as S. 2845 was introduced by Senator Susan Collins of Maine. The bill was enacted after being signed by the President on December 17, 2004. This legislation strove to take the 9/11 Commissions findings and implement them into law. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we mentioned six major problems the IC faced.

Being that the IC was managed mainly based on the National Security Act of 1947, the IRTPA brought changes to the IC by taking the bad and refining the good of each item. The major change seen in the IRTPA was the creation of the Director of National Intelligence. As we had seen in the 9/11 report, the DCI was way too overtasked, and the need for an Intelligence Community to have a director. The Structural Barriers to Performing Joint Intelligence Work In the wake of 9/11 the Joint Intelligence Community Council.

This council Chaired by the Director of National Intelligence, is comprised of all major Presidential advisors. It is chartered to “…assist the Director of National Intelligence in developing and implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort to protect national security…” This council also in the matter of advising the Legislative branch, may make recommendations to improve the IC. Lack of Common Standards and Practices Across the Foreign-Domestic Divide With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) came the call for a “performance of common services. This charge stands to ensure that services previously not shared, managed, or understood are standardized. It also stands to provide a set of “standards” for the agencies to follow, and hence stay regulated. Divided Management Of National Intelligence Capabilities Under the National Security Act of 1947, the DCI was the head of the IC, but under the IRTPA, a new position was enabled. The new position Director of National Intelligence, appointed by the President of the United States. This change gave the DCI more oversight of the CIA, and gave the President a subject matter expert, one who had a single focus job.

This also gives the DNI the ability to manage the tasking of national collection assets, a job not really performed before. Weak Capacity to Set Priorities and Move Resources In the case of the ability to set priorities, once again the charge goes to the DNI. He is charged to “establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community to ensure timely and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination…” This charge gives the DNI the ability manage resources, requirements, conflict resolution between agencies to include the use of assets, and collection platforms.

The only person the DNI must concede to the President. Too Many Jobs While we had an issue of the DCI having too many jobs before, some might say that the DNO now has too many jobs. This is a misconception, since the DNI has no intelligence agency to manage, rather he has department heads to manage that job. He instead focuses on the seamless and integrated manager of the whole gambit of intelligence. Too Complex and Secret The final goal of the IRTPA served to take the mystery and lack of oversight out of the IC. The establishment of an Inspector General to the DNI was enacted under the IRTPA.

This office serves to manage ethical matters, settle complaints of favoritism, and ensure civil liberties are upheld through the actions of the IC and concurrence with National and International Laws. Other Changes Driven by the IRTPA The four findings recommended by the legislation are the following: (1) Long-term success in the war on terrorism demands the use of all elements of national power, including diplomacy, military action, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. 2) To win the war on terrorism, the United States must assign to economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority that is assigned to military capabilities. (3) The legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States must commit to robust, long-term investments in all of the tools necessary for the foreign policy of the United States to successfully accomplish the goals of the United States. (4) The investments referred to in paragraph (3) will require increased funding to United States foreign affairs programs in general, and to priority areas as described in this title in particular.

By breaking these findings out, we can better see how the IC can transform and flex the major muscle it has the ability to do. While there were pages and pages of changes, and background these four findings standout as the major players in policy reforms. Long-term Success in the War on Terrorism To be successful in the war on terror, we must utilize all possible assets and allies assets to our advantage. To do this we need to focus our efforts by sharing information, and ensuring that agencies are receiving timely and relevant updates to collected intelligence to ensure overall success.

This sharing is critical to both foreign and domestic interests. Balance of Diplomatic, Economic and Military Influences The even balance of lethal, non-lethal and Humanitarian actions must be monitored and controlled. Too much use of any of these can degrade the ability of the United States and it’s ally’s effects in foreign actions. It is also important to remember that even in an attempt to show ourselves as a “hard target” we must show compassion and understanding to those less fortunate than us.

This is a necessity if only because we must show the rest of the world that we are not so devoid of emotion that we can relate with their plights and ways of life. Overall Governmental Commitment to Success The war of terror is a marathon not a race. Only though the applied funding, legislative drive to ensure resources, and the executive branch push to allow success of the IC can we succeed in the war on terror. We cannot allow political infighting, election cycles, opinion polls, or other media-like reports to stop our drive for the end-state.

While not always pretty, cost-effective, and popular, the needs of the IC to gather raw data must be protected. Added distractors such as political infighting in cases such as the passing, or re-authorization of the Patriot Act are great examples of the dangers the IC faces in achieving its goals. Commitment to Success and its Costs As stated above, this marathon is not always going to be cost-effective. Emerging technologies, payouts to sources, replacing of equipment, and other costs, not always made privy to the general public must be supported.

Failure to the fund the IC can be detrimental to their success. While oversight is needed to ensure embezzlement is not a factor, the budget increases the IC requests should not be delayed or jeopardized by political adversaries, nor used as a talking point. This is currently seen in the $500 Billion defense cuts enacted by supercommittee legislations as face now. Conclusion As we see the changes made in the past 8 years since it’s inception, the IRTPA has helped the IC, but has not fixed it yet.

While the DNI creation was a good thing, we do still see cases of the DNI have too much responsibility, and too much work. In some cases the added changes have brought more costs in bureaucratic startup, oversight, and staffing. While the need to separate the DCI from the rest of the agencies was important, the IRTPA has limited the CIA’s abilities an a variety of ways. Other advantages have been the information sharing of intelligence. The sharing has instituted policies and procedures as well as shared technology serves to better share information in a common platform.

All things being combined, the IRTPA has been a game changer for the IC, only through reform, and through lessons learned will we strengthen and improve our practices, keeping our country safer. Bibliography 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Report, Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 2004. Andrew, Christopher. For President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York: Harper Press. Beckner, Christian.

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