Mediquip: “Science of Selling Is in the Process”
It has oft been thought that the science of selling is in the process. This mantra is precisely what failed the protagonist of the Mediquip case. As with any scientific method, success revolves around a defined process that, when correctly executed, achieves an optimal result. Kurt Thaldorf failed to formulate and follow the correct selling process and resulted in a loss of sale.
The following examines Kurt’s failure and attempts to identify changes in his processes that more likely than not, could have contributed to sale success. Sale Starts Before Ever Meeting the Customer Kurt failed to conduct the proper due diligence before he contacted Lohmann University Hospital. This was his first oversight. He received notice of the customer’s interest in his product and had adequate time to procure facts about the customer that would have confirmed the hierarchy within the hospital responsible for buying Mediquip’s CT scanner.
Kurt was not overtly apathetic in his performance, though it did not appear that he was intrinsically motivated. He relied on the records of past sales to the customer, and when he found none, proceeded first to the employee at the hospital (Professor Steinborn) who had first inquired about his product, without ever confirming the employee’s role in the decision-making process. Kurt failed to identify all members of the DMU either before, or during, his first interview.
A result of Kurt’s oversight, communication within the customer organization was inaccurate and created a power struggle between the three parties responsible for making the purchase decision. Kurt’s failure to engage and analyze the true DMU resulted in his reliance on secondary information gleaned from interaction with secretaries (gatekeepers) – which likely was neither accurate, nor trustworthy and his own assumptions. This was evidenced in his records, when he left meetings believing he had made a positive impact on the DMU, without any clear evidence of positive persuasion.
The Prescription
Phase Kurt failed to identify the latent needs of the customer, the DMU’s true motivations, or the benefits in buying a CT scanner from Mediquip beyond those offered by its competitors. This lapse led to a failure in identifying the features, advantages and benefits of the Mediquip scanner with respect to each DMU member’s needs during the prescription phase of the sale, and ultimately resulted in conflicts within the buying unit.
Kurt was responsible for communicating with three members of the DMU – the professor (initiator & end user), the physicist (influencer & end user), and the hospital administrator (buyer) – with whom he was deficient in identifying the specific goals of each member. As a result, Kurt offered multiple price reductions in an attempt to satisfy the administrator’s needs, but failed to identify the administrator’s latent need to feel like he was getting the best deal.
By offering multiple price reductions he devalued the technical superiority of his product and made the administrator feel as though he may be getting swindled. Kurt should have identified the administrator’s concern for pricing and need to feel as though he was getting the best value for his dollar. He should have identified the benefits of Mediquip, in an apples- to- apples comparison to its competitors, showing the long term cost savings associated with the purchase through ease of upgrades and increased processing speed.
Once all beneficial characteristics of the Mediquip CT were identified, only then offered the best price possible. Finally, during the prescription phase, Kurt would have benefited had he met with all members of the DMU. Because he overlooked the need to identify each DMU member’s concerns, he failed to bring them together to facilitate a consensus of Mediquip’s advantages. Kurt could have served as a mediator helping to solve political conflicts within the DMU and thereby creating additional value for his customers.
Closing the Sale At the point where Kurt could have invoked open dialogue between the three DMU members, he would have availed himself of the SPIN technique. He could have identified the situation – a need for a new CT scanner. He could have asked open-ended questions, engaging the DMU, and simultaneously identified their concerns and needs. He could have addressed the problem – not merely the idea of not purchasing a CT scanner, but of purchasing an out-of-date model, a discount product, or the benefits of the higher-priced premium
Mediquip scanner.
Kurt missed the opportunity to identify the implications of not fulfilling their need. He could have questioned the administrator of the potential loss of patients, or lack of reimbursement from insurance companies who would not compensate for a machine that is not as accurate as the Mediquip standard. Lastly, Kurt could have proposed a solution to the customer hospital’s concerns by suggesting Mediquip held the answer. Kurt was deficient in formulating and implementing his sales process.
He failed in due diligence, prior to meeting with the client, during the prescriptive phase, and ultimately when he overlooked the importance of meeting with the DMU, as a group. He was unsuccessful in building up the value side of the cost equation, as it related to each member of the DMU, and continually chose to focus on cost reduction strategies rather than emphasizing the value of Mediquip’s CT machine. Kurt’s failure to follow the sales process cost Mediquip a new customer, a future potential business partnership and ultimately the sale of a multi-million dollar machine.
