Cuban missile crisis Narrative Essay

In the entire 40 years period of cold war, Cuban missile crisis represented the only event when both USA and USSR, the two nuclear powered adversaries, came to the doorsteps of a full-fledged armed confrontation. The crisis was precipitated by USSR’s decision to built nuclear missile bases at Cuba, and USA’s unqualified opposition to the USSR’s plans. The threat perception of USA was valid as Cuba was in the very close proximity to USA mainland, had communist orientation and therefore deployment of nuclear missiles presented real risks to national security of America.

The Cuban Missile Crisis brought entire world to standstill for a week with an imminent threat of a full blown nuclear war. Finally the crisis was resolved with USSR withdrawing its missiles and USA recognizing Cuba as a non-threatening nation Cuba, Cold War and USSR American Intelligence had turned its attention to Cuba soon after Cuban Revolution of 1959 when Fidel Castro overthrew dictatorial rule to establish his own government.

Despite the early period of bonhomie, USA’s perception of Castro took a negative side when he executed many supporters of former Cuban dictator who had pro US bearing, toyed with the idea of setting a date for free elections, confiscated American property without warning or paying compensation, and started his own line of dictatorship that suppressed freedom of expression and political opposition.

Naturally such ostensibly anti-American theatrics endeared Cuba to communist sections of world, and it increasingly became dependent on Soviet military and economic assistance. When US spy planes and reconnaissance efforts found by October 14, 1962 that Soviet Union was on the way of preparing a comprehensive missile base in Cuba that included launch pads for ICBM and MRBM missiles, it was immediately clear that world was headed towards a big showdown between two of its most powerful nations.

The news was rapidly conveyed to Intelligence heads and the office of President. It was immediately clear to every one that by placing nuclear missiles in the proximity of USA, USSR had openly challenged US influence. Many top level defense strategists felt that unless USA would act with resolution, its reputation would take a irrevocable beating from Soviet Union, providing a great impetus for growth of communist forces around the world.

Whereas US defense secretary of the time, Robert McNamara, argued against taking any action and ignoring the situation altogether, many believed that political fallout of the missile crisis could be devastating for USA. The one question that had stirred everyone related to intent and purpose of Soviet Union. No body was sure whether this was a mere populist stunt by Khrushchev to humiliate USA and gain popularity, a strategic error on part of Soviet leadership, or actual preparation of an impending war that was secretly pushed ahead in Kremlin.

The question of Cuba also, in way, could determine fate of John F. Kennedy who could fall out of public favor if he was perceived to be softening against the glaring communist offensive. Kennedy, in the initial phase of the situation when it was generally believed that no medium range missile base existed at Cuba, had already given vocal assurance to people that USA would not tolerate deployment of nuclear warheads in Cuba, thereby setting a yardstick for himself.

On the other hand, as Kennedy and highly placed government officials knew, Soviet Union had not shown any prudence in its action so far-their very decision to bring nuclear missiles close to US mainland indicated towards their inept political and strategic acumen, and Kennedy had apprehensions that on the slightest pretexts, Soviet Union may indulge in a full-fledged Nuclear War with USA. Meanwhile defense analyst correctly pointed out missiles deployed by Soviet Union would double the number of nuclear warheads in possession of Soviets against USA.

More, and even worse, once USA deliberately overlooks Soviet efforts of building the base, the Soviets would steadily reinforce the missile base and increase the number until they could easily fire multiple missiles at every city and military target in the United States. By increasing the firepower, USSR would effectively neutralize potential USA deterrent and response power and in the end, effectively routing out US’ capacity to offer any resistance. In the given circumstances, USA played its own strategic game of cover and fire.

On the face of it, the government did not jump to any explosive reaction and apparently thing went smoothly even a couple days after detection of Soviet nuclear facilities. On the advises of his intelligence chiefs, Kennedy himself let the visiting Soviet foreign minister, Andrei A. Gromyko know in a dissuading manner that US possessed advanced knowledge on deployment of MRBM and ICBM in Cuba. The calmness and assured way in which the news was conveyed to Soviet minister created a false sense of security in them, as they assured themselves that USA would not take any effective action, at least until the election.

Supplied with crucial information from intelligence, almost all the major facets of government pretended to carry business as usual, sending the watchful Soviet leaders in further complacency. Intelligence officers completely camouflaged their movements in and around White House, in order to avoid any suspicion on government’s next course. Most importantly, Soviets could not detect the constant flight of U2 planes over Cuba and therefore took US statements on the face of it. The Crisis and the Aftermath

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy broadcasted the knowledge of nuclear missiles discovery in Cuba, following which the crisis immediately bloomed into a full-fledged international crisis. There was immense pressure on Kennedy to launch offensive against Cuba, irrespective of USSR’s commitment. Kennedy did not heed to advises of armed conflict, but he firmly made it clear to Kremlin that unless Soviets withdrew themselves from Cuba, no meaningful line of dialogue could be established between the two countries.

USA intelligence had meanwhile clarified the issue that even Khrushchev was greatly distressed by escalation in tension and searching for a mutually acceptable to diffuse the situation. Political hawks, both in USA and USSR pressed their state heads for hard and non-evasive action to utilize the situation best in their own favors. There were universal calls for naval blockade, air strike, full scale invasion of Cuba or even pre-emptive nuclear strikes.

On the diplomatic channel, members of US intelligence committee, EXCOMM, were in secret conversation with UNO, where UNO would call for withdrawal of hostilities on part of both sides, thereby providing a dignified escape route to combating parties. On October 22 itself, the chief of Army Staff sent the message to US air force to get ready for full-blown strike, and the message was sent purposefully in un-coded form so that it could be captured by Soviet intelligence.

The strategic inputs from all the combined intelligence heads strongly refuted the idea of any strike against Cuba. They argued that although a pre-emptive strike may be successful operationally, its long term effect would be to weaken moral grounds of USA, where it would be forever looked as an aggressor. A strike after warning, on the other hand made no sense as it would provide soviets with enough time to organize their defense. Under these circumstances, US favored strategic blockade of Cuba-a non military but very strong move against USSR.

On the other hand the USSR leadership was also in a quandary due to their decision of deploying missiles and US’s tough stand that was not expected by Soviet leadership. However, now that the crisis was public and with US already taking a firm stand, USSR leadership found themselves in a very tight spot where compromise on their end would appear as victory of capitalist forces over communism. As a result Nikita Khrushchev let the perception broadcast in world media that USSR would not fire the first missile, but in case USA launches the attack on Cuba, USSR would be left with no option to strike back.

USA, despite keeping its air force at DEFCON2, was also aware of the crisis which may be precipitated if it would act without thinking. Throughout 26th and 27th October, senior diplomats on both sides tried to work out a solution that would be favorable to prestige of both nations while warding off threat of impending nuclear war. USSR was willing to remove the missiles from Cuba and see the crisis over, but it said that doing so just on the face of American protest would be construed as weakness in the communist world.

Therefore a trade off was reached where USA would remove the Jupiter missile system it had deployed in Turkey, following which USSR would announce the removal of its Cuban deployments. Finally the stalemate ended on 28th October with a statement by Nikita Khrushchev to the effect of destroying the launch sites in Cuba and recall of payloads back to USSR. Thus was prevented one of the most major crisis faced by World in 20th century.