Al Qaeda Network

Al Qaeda the ‘terrorist network’ and Osama bin Laden have carried out a complicated ‘media campaign and ‘public relations’ over the last 10 years (qtd. in Bevy, 2006).

As Bevy (2006) excerpted, “’terrorism-analyst’ think that these communications have been intended to draw out ‘emotional reactions’ and converse intricate ‘political messages’ to worldwide viewers as well as to explicit populaces in the ‘Islamic world’, the U.S., Asia, and Europe.”

A number of analysts and officials consider that ‘Al Qaeda’s messages’ hold signs that notify and educate operatives to get ready for and perform fresh attacks. Bin-Laden has referred to his ‘public-statements’ as significant chief sources for parties in a quest to know Al Qaeda’s political demands and ideology.

Osama bin Laden’s familiarities as a ‘financier’ and ‘logistical-coordinator’ for the Arab and Afghan struggle to the ‘Soviet-Invasion’ of Afghanistan throughout the 198os are considered to have supplied the backdrop for his principle that ‘Muslims’ can obtain valuable ‘military action’ motivated by ‘Islamic principles’ (Bevy, 2006).

According to Bevy (2006), his contact to the philosophies of ‘conservative Islamist-scholars’ in Saudi Arabia and his work with the Arab activist in Afghanistan offered the ideological and theological foundation for his principle in the interest of ‘puritanical Salafist Islamic-reform’ in Muslim societies and the need of ‘armed resistance’ in the countenance of ‘perceived aggression’ – an idea Al-Qaeda has since connected with a commonly-binding ‘Islamic principle’ recognized as “defensive-jihad” (qtd. in Bevy, 2006).

After a few years after he initiated setting up Arab volunteers to dispose of ‘Soviet forces’ from ‘Afghanistan’, bin-Laden had a ‘vision’; the instant had come, he informed his friends, to start a ‘global jihad’, or’ Islamic holy-war’, in against to the crooked ‘secular-governments’ of the ‘Muslim Middle East’ and ‘Western-powers’ that maintained them (New York Times, 2001).

Bin Laden, the ‘Saudi’ millionaire’, would utilize his campgrounds in Afghanistan to obtain ‘holy-warriors’ from around–the-world – who had at all times followed ‘local goals’ – and figure them into an ‘international-network’ which would wrestle to convey all Muslims under a ‘militant-version’ of ‘Islamic law’. At some stage in the ‘anti-Soviet jihad’ Bin-Laden and his combatants have been given American and Saudi funding; a number of ‘analysts’ think Bin-Laden himself had ‘security-training’ from the C.I.A. (BBC, 2004).

Following the ‘Iraqi-invasion’ of Kuwait, Bin Laden articulated these analyses in resistance to the beginning of ‘foreign military-forces’ to Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden illustrated the presence of non-Muslim troops and the U.S. in Saudi Arabia following the 1991 Gulf-War as a reason for the transformed commitment to ‘defensive jihad’ and the endorsement of violence against the United States and Saudi government.

What is Al Qaeda?

Any number of theories has been advanced as to the origins of the name “Al Qaeda”, from a reference to a computer file revealing the identities of Arab veterans of the Afghanistan conflict (the database), to Osama bin Laden’s alleged high-tech headquarters, deep in the mountains of Afghanistan (the secret base), drawings of which – impressive though entirely fictitious – were produced by the American media when U. S. operations began in October 2001 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007).

The name Al Qaeda, which instantly became the focus of the media attention following the August 1998 U. S. embassy bombings had long had mythical status. According to Chaliand and Blin (2007), Osama bin Laden himself had contributed to the mystery surrounding the name by never uttering it prior to the events of September 11. The groups’ leaders, in their internal communications, usually referred to it as “the society”, an internationally neutral appellation.

In fact, it was ‘Abdallah Azzam who had named the organization; in 19888, the first signs of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, ‘Azzam decided that he would not disband the Army of Arab volunteers he had created four years earlier but would use it to undertake a much vaster mission – re-conquest of the Muslim world (Chaliand & Blin, 2007).

To that end, he needed a standing vanguard of fighters to serve as leaders of the umma; he coined the term Al-Qaeda Al-Sulbah (the solid base) for this, which was also the headline of an editorial he wrote in al-Jihad in 1988.